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By Shafiqul Haque:
The aspirations of the mass uprising, the verdict of the referendum, the promise of constitutional reform, and economic pressures—before the new government lies a fundamental question: will change mean merely a change of government, or a transformation of the state itself?
Bangladesh’s politics in 2026 cannot simply be viewed as a year of transfer of power; doing so would perhaps overlook the most important story. Following a landslide victory in the February election, the BNP formed the government. But the political significance of this government extends far beyond an electoral victory. Behind it lie the July-August 2024 mass uprising, the state-reform initiatives undertaken during the interim government, and the public mandate in favour of constitutional changes expressed through the 2026 referendum.
The question facing the BNP government, therefore, is not merely how efficiently it can govern the country. The bigger question is how successfully it can transform the aspirations for political change generated by the July uprising into lasting institutional change.
This is where the long-term measure of the government’s success—or failure—will ultimately be determined.
The Referendum Verdict: Now Comes Implementation
The July 2024 movement began with demands for reform of the quota system in government employment. But it quickly developed into a broader political movement and eventually led to the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government. The movement created expectations not only for a change in government but also for a change in the way the state itself is governed. Demands emerged for credible elections, an independent judiciary, a politically neutral administration, accountability for law-enforcement agencies, and safeguards against excessive concentration of power.
Subsequently, efforts to institutionalise these demands led to the creation of the July National Charter. It contained proposals for reforms in various constitutional and state structures.
In the referendum held alongside the national parliamentary election on 12 February 2026, a clear majority of voters endorsed implementation of the July National Charter and the related constitutional reforms. Initially, the Election Commission announced more than 48 million “Yes” votes; the final figures published in the government gazette recorded 48,200,660 “Yes” votes and 22,071,726 “No” votes.
Politically, this represents a significant mandate. But this is not where the debate ends; rather, it is where a new debate begins. A public mandate expressed through a referendum and a formal constitutional amendment are not necessarily the same thing. Questions have already been raised about the constitutional basis and implementation mechanism of the Implementation Order issued by the interim government to give effect to the July National Charter. The central question now, therefore, is how the political verdict of the referendum will be translated into a constitutional and legal framework.
The BNP says it is committed to implementing the July Charter, but insists that this must be done through the procedures prescribed by the Constitution and the law. On the other hand, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the National Citizen Party, and several other parties have objected to the process of forming the parliamentary special committee and have called for the implementation framework of the July Charter itself to be followed.
It would be a mistake to view this dispute simply as political friction. At its core lies a fundamental question about Bangladesh’s constitutional future: where should the balance lie between the people’s mandate expressed through a referendum and the constitutional powers of Parliament?
For the new government, the safest course would be to resolve this question through political consensus as far as possible.
Constitutional Reform Is the BNP’s Biggest Test
The BNP has spoken about state reform for many years. Its 31-point programme contains a number of proposals concerning the electoral system, judiciary, administration, state institutions, and the balance of power. It now has the political authority to implement those reforms.
This presents both a historic opportunity and an uncomfortable question: Will the BNP create institutions and rules that could eventually constrain even a future BNP government?
This is perhaps the most important measure of the depth of democratic reform.
Proposals concerning limits on the prime minister’s tenure, parliamentary powers, judicial independence, the capacity of the Election Commission, the role of the president, and the introduction of a bicameral parliament could significantly alter Bangladesh’s political structure. But the real value of these reforms will depend on how effectively they establish a balance of power.
After all, the purpose of a constitution is not merely to give power to the government of the day; it is also to ensure that future governments cannot concentrate excessive power.
This is where the BNP faces an important moral and political test. Using its parliamentary majority, it could bring about rapid changes. But lasting reform requires a process in which the views of opposition parties, legal experts, civil society, and other stakeholders are also given meaningful space.
The government has already formed a 12-member parliamentary special committee to consider constitutional amendments. The committee is expected to review the entire Constitution and make recommendations consistent with the July Charter and the BNP’s electoral commitments. It has also indicated that it will seek the views of constitutional experts, lawyers, political parties, and other stakeholders.
If this genuinely becomes a participatory process, much of the current controversy could be reduced. But if opposition groups believe that attempts are being made to rewrite the Constitution without their participation, the political legitimacy of the reform process could come under question.
For the BNP, the most important principle may therefore be this: the Constitution must be established as a national document, not a party document.
Pressure on Both the Economy and Politics
However important the debate over state reform may be, for ordinary citizens the most immediate measure of government performance will be the economy.
The government faces pressure on multiple fronts, including inflation, employment, investment, the banking sector, and revenue collection. In July, the IMF said Bangladesh was facing significant fiscal, banking, and inflationary challenges. The war in the Middle East has created additional pressure by increasing import and subsidy costs. The organisation expects economic growth to fall to 3.5 percent in fiscal year 2027 and has warned that, without effective reforms, medium-term growth could fall below 3 percent.
The banking sector is a particular concern. The government will have to take difficult measures to address longstanding non-performing loans, weak management, and deficiencies in financial-sector governance. But these reforms are also linked to powerful business interests. Economic reform will therefore have to proceed with the realities of political economy firmly in mind.
At the same time, employment opportunities for young people represent a strategic challenge. Young people played a particularly important role in the 2024 movement. They now expect not only political change but also economic opportunity. Graduate unemployment, limited access to quality jobs, and excessive dependence on overseas employment could become sources of political dissatisfaction in the long term.
The government therefore needs to focus not only on the rate of economic growth but also on the quality of that growth—how many new jobs are being created, how much investment is coming in, and how broadly economic opportunities are being distributed.
This is precisely where the political aspirations of July intersect with economic reality.
If people do not see improvements in their everyday lives alongside reforms to state institutions, public confidence in political change may gradually weaken.
At the same time, if the government has to raise taxes, reduce subsidies, or take tough measures in the banking sector, there is a risk of public dissatisfaction in the short term. The IMF has likewise emphasised both revenue reform and targeted social protection for vulnerable groups.
In other words, the government faces a dual balancing act: it must implement reforms while also managing the costs of those reforms.
The same kind of balance is required in politics.
Bangladesh’s political history has often been characterised by conflict between governments and opposition parties. An important test for the new government will be whether it can create an effective and secure political space for the opposition.
A strong government is not necessarily a problem for democracy. The problem arises when institutions and political conditions capable of questioning a strong government become weak.
If one of the central lessons of the July movement was the need for accountability in the exercise of state power, that accountability must apply to the BNP government as well.
The BNP’s own political history is also relevant here. The party spent many years in opposition and experienced pressure from the power of the state. What lessons it draws from that experience after coming to power will also be important for Bangladesh’s future politics.
The Question of the Awami League
Another sensitive issue is the future of the Awami League. The party was unable to participate in the 2026 election. Consequently, the debate over how inclusive the current political system is will not end easily.
On the one hand, there are questions of accountability for the violence and human-rights violations of 2024. On the other hand, in the long term, there is also the question of how opportunities for political competition should be reconstructed within a democratic system.
Creating a balance between accountability and political inclusion will therefore be one of the most difficult tasks ahead.
Foreign Policy: Another Complex Challenge
The government also faces considerable complexity in foreign policy. Relations with India are the clearest example.
Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India, Bangladesh’s demand for her extradition, and her political statements from Indian soil in recent times have created new tensions between the two countries. In August, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman said that a favourable environment would be necessary before visiting India. At the same time, both Bangladesh and India have acknowledged the need to stabilise relations further.
For Bangladesh, pragmatic diplomacy rather than emotion is essential. Trade, water-sharing, borders, security, and connectivity with India are all extremely important. At the same time, relations with China, the United States, the European Union, and other partners are also economically and strategically necessary.
A balanced, multi-dimensional foreign policy is likely to serve Bangladesh’s national interests more effectively.
The Real Test
Ultimately, the greatest challenge facing the BNP government may not be any single issue. Rather, it will be the need to manage several different expectations simultaneously.
The aspirations of July say: the state must change.
The referendum says: the people have endorsed reform.
The BNP’s political commitments say: state reform is also part of its own programme.
Its parliamentary majority says: it now possesses the power to make decisions.
But the economy says: there is not much time.
People want results now—in the form of lower prices, jobs, law and order, and investment. The benefits of constitutional reform may not become visible for many years.
Managing these two different time horizons at the same time will be the real test of the government’s competence.
A change of government is not new in Bangladesh’s history. But the combined context of the July 2024 uprising and the 2026 election and referendum makes the present moment somewhat different. The issue is no longer simply who will hold power; the question of the rules by which the state itself will operate has also come to the forefront.
The BNP therefore has a rare opportunity.
It can choose to establish itself merely as an elected government. Or it can build a political and constitutional framework in which future governments—whether led by the BNP or another party—remain subject to law, institutions, and accountability.
The second path is undoubtedly more difficult.
Because ultimately, it would also limit the power of the party currently in government.
But lasting political legacies are generally created when a government establishes rules not only for itself, but also for the governments that come after it.
If the July movement was a call for change, and the referendum represented popular consent for that change, then the responsibility now facing the BNP government is to transform that change into sustainable institutions.
The final question is therefore very simple:
The government has changed—but will the state change?
Over the next several years, the answer to this question will become the most important story in Bangladesh’s politics.
Selected Sources
Bangladesh Election Commission / Government Gazette — Results of the 2026 July National Charter referendum.
bdnews24.com — The July National Charter, the referendum on constitutional reform, and the subsequent debate over implementation.
The Daily Star — The parliamentary special committee’s review of the Constitution and efforts to align it with the July Charter.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) — July 2026 assessment of Bangladesh’s economy, banking sector, inflation, and reform agenda.
Reuters — Bangladesh-India relations and Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s potential visit to India.
The writer is
Advocate Shafiqul Haque
Former Solicitor, Senior Courts of England and Wales
Former Mayor, London Borough of Tower Hamlets, United Kingdom
Political Analyst | Researcher | Author
