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By Shafiqul Haque:
The greatest tribute to the aspirations and sacrifices of July may be to transform political change into institutional reform—building a transparent, accountable, corruption-free administration and restoring public confidence in the state.
Bangladesh’s 2026 should not be viewed merely as a year of political transition. Doing so would overlook perhaps the most important story unfolding beneath the change of government. The BNP has formed the government with a substantial parliamentary majority following the February election. But the significance of this government extends far beyond an electoral victory. It comes against the backdrop of the July-August 2024 mass uprising, the state-reform initiatives undertaken during the interim government, and the public mandate expressed through the 2026 referendum in favour of constitutional reform.
The central question before the new government, therefore, is not simply whether it can govern the country efficiently. The larger question is whether it can transform the political and social aspirations generated by the July uprising into lasting, effective and people-centred institutional change.
This will ultimately become one of the most important measures of the government’s long-term success.
The Aspirations of July: The Driving Force for Change
The movement of July 2024 began with demands for reform of the quota system in government employment. It quickly developed into a broader political movement and eventually led to the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government. The movement generated not only a demand for a change of government, but also new expectations about how the state should be governed.
Credible elections, judicial independence, administrative neutrality, accountability of law-enforcement agencies, effective action against corruption and safeguards against excessive concentration of state power all became important elements of public expectation.
The sacrifices of July should therefore not be confined to the history of a political event. Their true significance will be realised only when those aspirations are reflected in state institutions, administrative culture and the everyday experience of citizens.
The Referendum Mandate and the Responsibility to Deliver
Subsequent efforts to institutionalise these aspirations led to the July National Charter, which contains proposals for reforms across various constitutional and state institutions.
In the referendum held alongside the national parliamentary election on 12 February 2026, a majority of voters supported implementation of the July National Charter and the associated constitutional reforms. The Election Commission initially announced more than 48 million “Yes” votes; the final figures published in the government gazette recorded 48,200,660 “Yes” votes and 22,071,726 “No” votes.
Politically, this represents a significant mandate. But popular approval through a referendum and formal constitutional amendment are not necessarily the same thing. Questions have also been raised about the constitutional basis and implementation mechanism of the Implementation Order issued by the interim government for carrying out the July National Charter.
The most important task now, therefore, is to determine how the political mandate expressed through the referendum can be translated effectively into a constitutional and legal framework.
The BNP has stated that it remains committed to implementing the July Charter, while insisting that this must take place through the procedures established by the Constitution and the law. On the other hand, Jamaat-e-Islami, the National Citizens Party and several other political groups have objected to the process of forming the parliamentary special committee and have called for the implementation mechanism envisaged by the July Charter itself.
These differences should not be viewed simply as political confrontation. At their heart lies a fundamental question about Bangladesh’s constitutional future: How should the popular mandate expressed through a referendum be balanced with the constitutional authority of Parliament?
For the new government, the most constructive and secure path would be to seek a solution based, as far as possible, on political consensus.
Constitutional Reform: A Historic Opportunity
The BNP has spoken of state reform for many years. Its 31-point programme contains a number of proposals concerning the electoral system, the judiciary, the administration, state institutions and the balance of power.
It now has the political authority to implement those reforms.
This is both a historic opportunity and a major responsibility.
The most important question may be this: Will the BNP build institutions and rules that can hold not only future governments, but potentially the BNP government itself, accountable?
That may be the most meaningful measure of the depth of democratic reform.
Proposals relating to term limits for the Prime Minister, parliamentary powers, judicial independence, the capacity of the Election Commission, the role of the President and a possible bicameral Parliament could significantly reshape Bangladesh’s political structure.
But the true value of these reforms will depend on how effectively they establish checks and balances.
A constitution is not designed merely to give power to the government of the day. It must also ensure that no future government can excessively concentrate power.
A Corruption-Free Administration: The Heart of State Reform
Although state reform begins with constitutional questions, citizens will experience its real impact primarily through the administration.
When an ordinary citizen visits a government office for a service, when a businessperson seeks a licence or approval, when a young person looks for employment, or when an investor considers investing in Bangladesh, the state is experienced through the administrative system.
That is why building a corruption-free, efficient, impartial and accountable administration should be central to fulfilling the aspirations of July.
Simply conducting anti-corruption drives will not be enough. The government must also reform the administrative structures and processes that create opportunities for corruption.
Greater transparency through digital public services, reducing excessive individual discretion in decision-making, ensuring transparency in public procurement, prioritising merit and competence in recruitment and promotion, and guaranteeing independent investigation and effective prosecution of corruption allegations are all areas where visible progress is essential.
At the same time, the civil service should be governed by professionalism, integrity and constitutional responsibility rather than political loyalty.
A change of government becomes meaningful when ordinary citizens can actually experience a change in their relationship with the state.
Pressure on Both the Economy and Politics
However important state reform may be, the most immediate measure of government performance for ordinary people will remain the economy.
Inflation, employment, investment, the banking sector and public revenue all present significant challenges. The IMF reported in July that Bangladesh was facing substantial fiscal, banking and inflationary challenges. The conflict in the Middle East has created additional pressure through higher import and subsidy costs. The IMF has projected that growth could fall to 3.5 percent in fiscal year 2027 and warned that, without effective reforms, medium-term growth could fall below 3 percent.
The banking sector is a particular concern. The government will have to take difficult decisions to address longstanding non-performing loans, weak management and governance deficiencies in the financial sector. But these reforms also involve powerful business interests. Economic reform must therefore proceed with a clear understanding of the realities of political economy.
At the same time, employment for young people is a strategic issue.
Young people played a particularly important role in the 2024 movement. They now expect not only political change but also economic opportunity. Graduate unemployment, limited access to quality employment and excessive dependence on overseas employment could become sources of political dissatisfaction over the longer term.
The government therefore needs to focus not only on the rate of economic growth but also on the quality of that growth—how many new jobs are being created, how much investment is coming into the country and how widely economic opportunity is being distributed.
If people do not see improvements in their everyday lives alongside institutional reform, confidence in political change may gradually weaken.
At the same time, raising taxes, reducing subsidies or taking tough measures in the banking sector may generate short-term public dissatisfaction. Reform must therefore be accompanied by appropriate social protection and careful management of its social costs.
A Strong Government, but Stronger Institutions
A similar balance is needed in politics.
Bangladesh’s political history has often been characterised by confrontation between governments and opposition parties. An important opportunity for the new government is to create a political environment in which the government can remain strong while opposition voices and institutional accountability are also protected.
A strong government is not, in itself, a problem for democracy. The problem arises when institutions and political space capable of questioning a powerful government become weak.
If one of the principal lessons of the July uprising was the need for accountability in the exercise of state power, that accountability must apply equally to the BNP government.
This should not be viewed as a weakness. It could instead demonstrate political maturity.
The more a government embraces transparency and accountability, the stronger public confidence is likely to become.
The Future of the Awami League and Political Inclusion
Another sensitive question concerns the future of the Awami League.
The party was unable to participate in the 2026 election. As a result, the debate over how inclusive the present political system should be is unlikely to disappear quickly.
On one side is the question of accountability for the violence and human-rights violations of 2024. On the other is the longer-term question of how political competition can be reconstructed within a democratic system.
Maintaining a balance between accountability and political inclusion will therefore be one of the most difficult tasks ahead.
Where crimes or human-rights violations have occurred, due process and the rule of law must prevail. At the same time, political disagreement should not itself be treated as a crime. That distinction is essential to the health of any democratic system.
A Pragmatic and Balanced Foreign Policy
The government also faces considerable complexity in foreign policy, with relations with India being the clearest example.
Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India, Bangladesh’s demand for her extradition and her political statements from Indian soil have all created new tensions in bilateral relations.
For Bangladesh, pragmatism rather than emotion will be essential.
Trade, water, borders, security and connectivity make relations with India critically important. At the same time, relations with China, the United States, the European Union and other international partners are also important to Bangladesh’s economic and strategic interests.
A balanced, diversified and national-interest-driven foreign policy is likely to serve Bangladesh best.
How Will the BNP Use This Historic Opportunity?
Ultimately, the greatest challenge facing the BNP government may not be any single issue. It will be the task of managing several different expectations simultaneously.
The aspirations of July say that the state must change.
The referendum says that the public has endorsed reform.
The BNP’s own political commitments say that state reform is part of its agenda.
Its parliamentary majority means that it now has the authority to make decisions.
But the economy says that time is limited.
People want relief from high prices, jobs, law-and-order problems, corruption and weak investment conditions now. Constitutional and institutional reforms, by contrast, may take years before their full benefits become visible.
Managing these two different timelines simultaneously will be a major test of the government’s leadership.
But the BNP does not need to view this merely as a test. It can also view it as a historic opportunity.
It can choose to establish itself simply as an elected government. Or it can build a political and administrative culture in which future governments—whether BNP or another political party—remain accountable to law, institutions and the people.
That would require several clear priorities:
A genuine zero-tolerance policy towards corruption, accompanied by effective enforcement;
Merit, competence, integrity and neutrality in public administration;
Greater transparency and digital accountability in public services;
An independent judiciary and effective access to justice;
Stronger independence of the Election Commission and other constitutional institutions;
An effective role for Parliament and the opposition;
Stronger governance and accountability in the banking and financial sectors;
Better employment and entrepreneurial opportunities for young people;
Meaningful participation by political parties, legal experts, civil society and other stakeholders in constitutional reform.
If these measures can be implemented, the aspirations of July will not remain merely a chapter in political history. They could instead establish a new standard for the governance of Bangladesh.
The Greatest Tribute to July
Governmental change is not new in Bangladesh’s history. But the combined context of the July-August 2024 mass uprising and the 2026 election and referendum gives the present moment particular significance.
The question is no longer simply who will govern the country. It is also about the rules by which the state will operate, how independent its institutions will be, and how accountable the government will remain to its citizens.
The BNP therefore has a rare opportunity.
If it can transform the sacrifices of July into good governance, a corruption-free administration, the rule of law, economic fairness and strong democratic institutions, that would be the greatest tribute to the aspirations of July.
A government’s lasting legacy is not determined simply by how many development projects it completes or how long it remains in office. It is also determined by what institutions it leaves behind—institutions capable of requiring the next government to uphold good governance as well.
The second path is undoubtedly more difficult.
Because it ultimately places limits on the power of the government itself.
But this is precisely where the strength of democratic leadership lies—not in maximising its own power, but in strengthening institutions so that the rights of citizens never depend solely on the wishes of an individual or political party.
If July was a call for change, if the referendum represented public consent for that change, and if the BNP now carries the political responsibility to deliver it, then its greatest task is to transform that change into durable state institutions.
The final question, therefore, is not simply:
“Has the government changed—but will the state change?”
A more hopeful question is:
“Can the BNP turn the dream of July into a Bangladesh where the state is transparent, the administration is corruption-free, institutions are accountable and citizens’ rights are protected?”
The answer to that question may well become the most important story in Bangladesh’s politics over the coming years.
Advocate Shafiqul Haque
Former Solicitor, Senior Courts of England and Wales
Former Mayor, London Borough of Tower Hamlets, United Kingdom
Political Analyst | Researcher | Author
